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Allowing Utilities to Compete in the Distributed
Energy Resources Market: A Comparative Analysis
Jennifer A. Neuhauser∗
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the adoption of the nation’s first net metering law
in 1981, the state of Minnesota has proactively sought policies and
programs to encourage the development of renewable energy.1 Part of
this initiative includes a legislative mandate requiring incumbent
utilities to produce 27.5% of their electricity from renewable sources
by 2025, as well as reducing electricity sales every year by the
equivalent of 1.5% of their revenues.2 Yet, in spite of strong popular
and legislative support in developing renewable energy resources,
Minnesota continues to spend more than $1 billion every year
importing fossil fuels, which generate almost 90% of its energy.3
One method of encouraging wider adoption of renewable energy
sources is to foster competition and innovation in the distributed
energy resources (DER)/distributed generation (DG) market.
Copyright 2015, by JENNIFER A. NEUHAUSER.
∗ Major Jennifer Neuhauser is a U.S. Army Judge Advocate in the U.S.
Army’s Environmental Law Division. She has previously served in South Korea
and Germany as an Ordnance officer, in Iskandariya, Iraq as part of the 172nd
Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and in Afghanistan as an adviser to the
Supreme Court of Afghanistan and as the Deputy Officer-In-Charge of the
Justice Center in Parwan. Master of Laws in Environmental Law, The George
Washington University, 2014; Master of Laws in Military and Administrative
Law, The Judge Advocate’s Legal Center and School, 2010; J.D., University of
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University, for her generous substantive and editorial feedback during the
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1. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2003) (requiring net metering for qualifying
facilities less than 40 kW; requiring purchase of all energy and capacity at
avoided cost for all facilities more than 40 kW). Net metering is “a billing
arrangement that allows customers to receive compensation for unused
electricity that they send back to the utility grid.” BILL GRANT & LISE TRUDEAU,
MINNESOTA DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND NET METERING 13 (2012).
2. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691 (2008).
3. Linda Taylor, Clean Energy: Minnesota’s Legacy and Economic Future
1 (Feb. 2012), http://fresh-energy.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Factsheet_RES.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WX5M-FZ9L.

376

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

Generally speaking, distributed generation is on-site power
generation “designed to meet local needs.”4 Distributed energy
resource systems enhance or provide backup to traditional electric
power systems. Usually DG requires connection to the commercial
power grid due to the intermittent nature of its fuel source: the sun
doesn’t always shine, and the wind doesn’t always blow.5 Because
of its reliance on the commercial grid, incumbent utilities can
significantly influence how quickly DG is adopted. Nonetheless,
recent years have seen increased incumbent utility efforts to frustrate
the growth of DG—particularly in Arizona, California, and
Hawaii—because many utilities see DG initiatives as threatening
potential sources of revenue, as well as imperiling grid stability and
reliability.6 This article argues that rather than fighting against third
party efforts to expand DG, incumbent utilities in Minnesota should
embrace its inevitable widespread adoption by competing in the DG
market. This article examines the possible policy and practical
implications of fostering a competitive DER market in Minnesota
with incumbent utilities and third parties competing to offer DER
products and services. Lastly, this article demonstrates why allowing
incumbent utilities to directly compete against third parties in
DG/DER, if done in a thoughtful, deliberate manner with
accompanying regulation to mitigate unfair advantages, is the best
path forward for Minnesota utility consumers.
I. BACKGROUND
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electrical power was considered
to be a “natural monopoly” with service by more than one electric
utility considered both uneconomical and duplicative.7 Usually the
4. GRANT & TRUDEAU, supra note 1, at 9. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2013)
(defining “distributed generation” as means a facility that: (1) has a capacity of
ten megawatts or less; (2) is interconnected with a utility’s distribution system,
over which the commission has jurisdiction; and (3) generates electricity from
natural gas, renewable fuel, or a similarly clean fuel, and may include waste
heat, cogeneration, or fuel cell technology.).
5. Though DG can also include combined heat and power systems (which
capture and utilize waste heat) or natural gas-fired generators, this paper will
mainly concentrate on renewable sources. In this paper DG and DER will be
used interchangeably.
6. See generally Mark Chediak, et al., Utilities Feeling Rooftop Solar Heat
Start Fighting Back, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2013-12-26/utilities-feeling-rooftop-solar-heat-start-fighting-back.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/N38H-CUWG.
7. See Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power
Market: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27–29 (2000). Under the
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natural monopoly of electrical service provision was vertically
integrated, with a single company providing generation, transmission,
and distribution of electrical power.8 Under this model, the utility
assumes a duty to serve customers in a geographical area and accepts
the obligation to interconnect and extend service per request in
exchange for exclusivity, expected recovery of costs, and a reasonable
rate of return.9 Consequently, investment in electrical utilities is
traditionally considered “a safe, but unimaginative” venture, with an
emphasis on low risk in exchange for small, but reliable returns.10
As electricity use spread throughout the United States, utility
companies built ever-larger power plants to meet the additional
demand. Increased demand required larger power plants, which in
turn increased performance and reduced production costs.11 Such
growth also meant more customers increasing the utility rate base
and lowering costs for all by increasing efficiency.12 This model
worked well until the energy crises of the 1970s prompted
policymakers to re-examine the natural monopoly model.13
Beginning with the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA), Congress enacted several provisions to move utilities
away from the vertically integrated single-provider structure in
place since the 1930s.14 PURPA required incumbent utilities to
purchase excess power generated by so-called “qualifying facilities”
(QFs) at their “avoided cost,” which is the price the utility would

theory of natural monopoly, the most economical way to serve a market demand
in a natural monopoly is by a single firm. See generally, WILLIAM W. SHARKEY,
THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY vii–27 (1982).
8. See AMORY LOVINS & ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., REINVENTING FIRE:
BOLD BUSINESS SOLUTIONS FOR THE NEW ENERGY ERA 172 (2011).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. DEP’T OF ENERGY, A PRIMER ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES, DEREGULATION,
AND RESTRUCTURING OF U.S. ELECTRICITY MARKETS 6.1 (2002).
12. See id.
13. See Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and
Regulation: a Look Back, 25 NATURAL RES. & ENV’T. 33, 34 (Summer 2010). In
a PowerPoint presentation accompanying the article the author notes,“The Oil
Embargo of the 1970s changed things in a hurry. Rapid increases in the cost of
fuel to operate power plants translated into equally large jumps in retail power
prices. Continued increases in oil prices and unstable fuel supplies led electric
utilities to construct new power plants that relied on domestic coal and uranium.
These plants cost much more to build than simple oil or natural gas-fired
generators. Consequently, the fixed costs of utility operations increased, further
increasing retail electricity prices. The natural consequence was consumer
complaints and increased regulatory oversight.”
14. Id. at 34.
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pay to acquire the power from an alternative source.15 With its
departure from the traditional regulatory model and vertically
integrated structure, PURPA encouraged the development of
alternative sources of power, including cogeneration and small
power production facilities.16 Furthermore, §210(e) of PURPA
exempted QFs from most state and federal utility regulations,
bolstering the development of Independent Power Producers (IPPs)
who owned generation resources outside of those owned by the
incumbent utilities.17 Prior to 2005, utility ownership of QFs was
restricted to 50% to assure participation by third parties.18
The passage of PURPA marked both an initial departure from
the regulated monopoly model and a greater reliance on market
forces to set wholesale energy prices. PURPA was followed by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT 1992), which was designed to
“further development of IPPs and competition in wholesale electric
markets” by allowing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to order utilities to provide transmission service to outside
providers generating electric energy for wholesale sale.19 FERC
ruled on specific transmission requests on a case-by case basis,
which meant that the impact of the new law was limited to those
entities seeking transmission service.20 Though competition
increased, incumbent utilities routinely favored their own utilityowned generators in the interconnection process, while creating
barriers to other parties such as refusing to grant easements across
utility properties.21 During the 1990s, FERC abandoned their caseby-case approach by promulgating FERC Order No. 888, requiring
each utility that owns, operates, or controls transmission
facilities to provide open and nondiscriminatory transmission
service to others on the same basis as the utility provided
for its own needs….Further, the regulations required
15. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210,
92 Stat. 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2011)) [hereinafter
PURPA]. A “qualifying facility” is a renewable energy or cogeneration facility
that meets FERC standards that qualify it for a myriad of regulatory and financial
incentives. As enacted in 1978, it included the mandatory purchase of excess
power by incumbent facilities. As amended in 2005, utilities that are able to
demonstrate that the QFs in their service areas have competitive options, may be
exempted from the purchase mandate.
16. Id. See also Dennis, supra note 13.
17. PURPA, supra note 15, at § 210(e).
18. ROBERT E. BURNS & KENNETH ROSE, PURPA TITLE II COMPLIANCE
MANUAL 8 (2014).
19. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-468, 106 Stat. 2776.
20. See id.
21. JAMES BRODER ET. AL., THE MILLENNIAL REVOLUTION IN ELECTRIC
TRANSMISSION: FROM MONOPOLY TO THE MARKETPLACE 12 (2014).
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‘functional unbundling’; that is, utilities were required to
separate the transmission portion of their services from
their generation and power marketing functions, and to
state separate rates for each such service.22
PURPA, EPACT 1992, and FERC Order No. 888 reflected a
wider trend of opening wholesale markets to competition as well as
a push by the federal government to diversify the energy market
through the presence of IPPs. The success of IPPs in wholesale
markets demonstrated the feasibility of a non-vertically integrated
model.23 Similar changes occurred at the retail level, with several
states pursuing competitive markets for the retail supply of electric
power while simultaneously seeking supply through alternative
resources and distributed generation.24
Today, there are two broad models at the retail level: the
vertically integrated utility and the retail choice model. Under the
vertically integrated utility model, transmission and distribution
services are provided by a single entity with prices set by the
regulatory authority.25 Conversely, the retail choice model allows
consumers to select their energy provider with the utility providing
delivery.26 The retail choice model requires the utility’s delivery
charges to be set by the regulatory authority, while the non-utility
provider sets its own pricing for generation.27 Generation services
in the retail choice model can be provided by either a competitive
provider or by a “provider of last resort.”28
The history of deregulation at both the wholesale and retail levels
is relevant to the issue of allowing utilities to compete in DER
services for several reasons. First of all, the transition to deregulation
demonstrates the natural tendency of an entrenched monopoly, such
as a vertically integrated utility, to keep the status quo and resist
competition consistent with the existing regulatory structure and its
duties to shareholders. Second, the opening of the market to wider
competition forced utilities to contemplate a different way of doing
business once they realized change was inevitable. Third, regardless
of the activities of newcomers, incumbent utilities still play a large
role in influencing the market due to their access to customers,

22. Dennis, supra note 13, at 36.
23. BRODER, supra note 21, at 13.
24. See NAVIGANT, EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY STRUCTURE IN
THE U.S. AND RESULTING ISSUES ii (2013).
25. Id. at iii.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at iv.
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familiarity with existing structures, and need to plan and provide
service as part of the regulatory compact.
One example of an innovation caused by deregulation is the
expansion of environmentally friendly offerings by utilities. In their
paper “Deregulation and Environmental Differentiation in the Electric
Utility Industry,” authors Magali Delmas, Michael Russo, and Maria
Montes-Sancho argue that deregulation and the fungibility of the
kilowatt-hour forced incumbent utilities to differentiate themselves by
offering more green power.29 The authors assert prior to deregulation,
utilities catered to three broad classes of customer: industrial,
commercial, and residential. Because of their position as a monopoly,
utilities had “little incentive to think further about how customers
differed within each of these customer classes.”30 Even if there was a
demand within these classes for green power, prior to deregulation
there was little incentive for incumbent utilities to offer consumers
choices.31 The authors also point out that traditionally utilities
aggregated costs from all types of generation and
apportioned them to kilowatt-hour prices. Under this regime
. . . creating a green power product by pulling out just the
costs associated with those plants represented not only a
substantial shift in accounting practice, but, equally, a
profound regulatory challenge. These factors worked
together to keep potential ‘green customers’ out of the
picture prior to retail deregulation.32
With the arrival of deregulation, incumbent utilities were forced
to innovate in order to respond to competitive threats in the
marketplace. Previously suppressed customer classes, such as the
‘green’ customer, emerged as the historical accounting practices and
lack of innovation fell by the wayside. Though incumbent utilities
may resist change created by the proliferation of competitionenhancing policies and legislation, eventually they concede the
inevitable and embrace competition, adapting in ways that are
advantageous to the ordinary consumer. The evolution of utilities in
the face of enhanced competition offers useful lessons for the future
of distributed generation because it demonstrates that competition
combined with appropriate incentive drives innovation.

29. See Magali Delmas, et al., Deregulation and Environmental Differentiation
in the Electric Utility Industry, 28 STRAT. MGMT. J. 189, 192 (2007).
30. Id. at 193.
31. See id.
32. Id.
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II. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
Though the terms “distributed generation” and “distributed
energy resources” may be unfamiliar to most Americans, DG and
DER actually pre-date the centralized, gigawatt-scale power plants
and high-voltage transmission lines that are the hallmark of modern
life in America.33 Even as central power generation evolved, many
consumers, such as hospitals, telecommunication sites, and the
military, found it advantageous to have on-site power generation as
backup, usually in the form of diesel generators.34 Unfortunately, the
use of diesel generators for back-up power is an imperfect solution
in the event of a prolonged blackout: “Diesel generators are not
designed to run for weeks at a time, and fuel storage capacities vary
widely. Additionally, the preventive maintenance for these diesel
generators does not always prepare the generators for 100%
availability; they have a low probability of 60% to start when
needed.”35 Another commenter adds, “Backup generators are filthy,
wasteful, and prone to performance problems depending on the
frequency and duration of grid outages.”36
Though today’s rooftop solar DG systems are cleaner and
ultimately cheaper in the long run than diesel generators, they still
require connection to the commercial power grid due to variability
in their energy supply. However, advancements in battery and
storage technology presage that the ability to operate independently
from the grid may only be a few years away; Edison Electrical
Institute imagines a future where “efficient energy storage combined
with distributed generation could create the ultimate risk to grid
viability.”37 Today, the military is investing heavily in technologies
coupling DG with renewable energy and advanced storage,
allowing the Department of Defense (DOD) to potentially operate
independently of the commercial power grid in the event of a
33. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION
i (2007) [hereafter BENEFITS OF DG].
34. See id.
35. JUANIA GIRALDEZ ET AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY,
VALUING ENERGY SECURITY: CUSTOMER DAMAGE FUNCTION METHODOLOGY AND
CASE STUDIES AT DOD INSTALLATIONS 2 (2012).
36. William Pentland, Backup Generators Are the Bad and Ugly of
Decentralized Energy, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/williampentland/2013/04/15/backup-generators-are-the-bad-and-ugly-of
decentralized-energy/, archived at http://perma.cc/L3RQ-F2BG.
37. PETER KIND, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL
ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3 (2013).
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major disaster or national emergency.38 This technology will both
enhance energy security and reduce fuel costs.39
Along with its future potential to act as a reliable backup power
source or possible displacement of the commercial grid, DG
presently offers many benefits to consumers and utilities alike. For
example, a study conducted by Southern California Edison found
that adding DG to the grid system reduces peak demand, thereby
deferring necessary upgrades in circuit capacity.40 DG also
improves the efficiency of the transmission and distribution (T&D)
network by replacing power generation from central facilities with
demand-side reactive power resources, which also “frees up useful
T&D system capacity for additional real power transfers from
generation sources to loads.”41 Using DG to provide reactive
power on-site also reduces both distribution line losses and
transmission line losses, improving the overall capabilities of the
T&D system.42 In fact, one study found:
Distribution losses are the largest percentage of total system
losses, comprising about 27% of total losses. When reactive
power is supplied from a Distributed Energy Resource
(DER) such as a microturbine, losses on the distribution
feeder can be reduced or even eliminated. Local power
quality can also be significantly improved.43
Overall, DG installations can defer T&D upgrades and
renewable DG provides environmental benefits that both benefit
society as a whole and enable utilities to meet legislative
mandates.44 DG can also improve overall power quality and grid
security. Furthermore, some DG, such as rooftop solar installations,
helps utilities avoid contentious eminent domain battles when
planning for system expansions and upgrades, thereby improving
relations with the local community.45
38. S.V.T. NGUYIN, ET. AL., MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
MICROGRID STUDY: ENERGY SECURITY FOR DOD INSTALLATIONS iii (2012).
39. Issue: Military Microgrids, NEMA, http://www.nema.org/Policy
/Documents/Military%20Microgrids.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5U8KLSBR(last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
40. BENEFITS OF DG, supra note 33, at 3-4.
41. Id. at 4-2.
42. Id.
43. J.D. Kueck, et al. Voltage Regulation: Tapping Distributed Energy
Resources, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 2004, at 46.
44. L. BIRD ET. AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLES ENERGY LABORATORY,
REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 11 (2013).
45. JOHN FARRELL, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, THE POLITICAL
AND TECHNICAL ADVANTAGES OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 17 (2011).

2015]

ALLOWING UTILITIES TO COMPETE

383

However, the rise of DG is not entirely good news for the
incumbent utilities. Reliable power requires both predictability and
flexibility in the generation, transmission, and distribution of
electricity, which is easier to provide with centralized management
and planning of energy resources.46 With the growth of DG systems,
customer-owned generation may be outside the utility’s control,
largely unmonitored, and therefore unavailable to regulate the
balance of energy supply and demand.47 Furthermore, DG power
production may not correspond to peak electricity demand, and
areas with high penetration of DG production may actually require
additional investment in infrastructure to handle excess energy
supply.48 Many utilities argue the revenue generated from customers
with DG assets does not offset the costs to act as standby power for
those customers, leading to issues of fairness and cost allocation—
while some customers reduce their individual energy costs through
self-generation, part of their share of distribution costs are shifted to
non-DG customers.49 Utility companies are powerless to refuse
service to DG customers, as current law mandates utilities provide
access to the grid for all customers regardless of whether it is being
used for power delivery or merely for backup.50 This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that consumers with fewer resources are less
likely to have access to DER.51
Many in the electric utility industry have termed the rise of
DG/DER as an “existential threat” to the livelihood of incumbent
utilities.52 Steven Corneli, Senior Vice President of Policy, Strategy,
and Sustainability at NRG Energy notes the expansion of DER is
“increasingly eroding the volumetric sales of electricity by utilities,
leaving utilities with fewer kWh and kW of sales over which to

46. JAMES NEWCOMB ET. AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, NEW BUSINESS
MODELS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: THE TRANSITION FROM VALUE CHAIN TO
VALUE CONSTELLATION 7 (2013) [hereafter NEW BUSINESS MODELS].
47. Jeff St. John, Hawaii’s Solar Grid Landscape and the Nessie Curve,
GREEN TECH SOLAR (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/hawaiis-solar-grid-landscape-and-the-nessie-curve, archived at http://perma
.cc/V8MR-ZVPG.
48. NEW BUSINESS MODELS, supra note 46, at 17.
49. John Slocum, Threat from Behind the Meter: The Case for Utilities to
Compete Directly with Distributed Resources, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, July
2013, at 49–50.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Richard Martin, Distributed Generation Poses Existential Threat to
Utilities, FORBES.COM, (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/pikeresearch
/2013/08/26/distributed-generation-poses-existential-threat-to-utilities/, archived at
http://perma.cc/2AK6-3GZX.
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spread their fixed and operating costs.”53 DER technologies are
growing demonstrably cheaper: Between 2008 and 2012, the cost of
photovoltaic (PV) panels dropped from $3.80/watt to $.86/watt.54 At
the same time, much of the infrastructure utilities rely on requires
upgrading or replacement; it is projected that the United States.
electric power structure could require $3.5 trillion over the next 40
years to replace aging infrastructure.55 Upgrades to existing facilities
and infrastructure due to age, security needs, reliability issues, or
environmental standards increase fixed costs to utilities, which pass
these costs along to their customers.56 Since 2002, annual spending
per customer on routine tasks such as maintenance and distribution
equipment has increased at roughly twice the rate of inflation.57
Additionally, DG/DER contributes to stranded costs, which occur
when the incumbent utility invests in infrastructure that becomes
redundant in a competitive environment.58 Oftentimes utilities will
seek to recover stranded costs by charging their customers a stranded
cost recovery fee, further increasing rates among its remaining
ratepayers.59
Meanwhile, incumbent utilities are experiencing flat or falling
demand due to phenomenon such as demand saturation and
increasingly efficient appliances.60 Demand saturation occurs when
“consumers in rich countries can afford and already use as much of
the basic commodities and services they need and want…when
consumers reach high per capital levels of consumption, be it pasta,
soda, miles driven, or electricity, there is little or no gain from
consuming more.”61 Additionally, federal and state governments
continue to support policies such as the Solar Investment Tax Credit,
which provides a 30% tax credit for solar systems on residential and
commercial properties, as well as energy efficiency and power
53. Slocum, supra note 49. NRG Energy is a wholesale energy company
based in Princeton, New Jersey.
54. Richard Read, Will Solar Panels Destroy Electric Utilities’ Business
Model? Yes, They Say, GREENCARREPORTS (May 31, 2013), http://www.green
carreports.com/news/1084508_will-solar-panels-destroy-electric-utilities-businessmodel-yes-they-say, archived at http://perma.cc/BZU6-J4SA.
55. LOVINS, supra note 8, at 166.
56. Id.
57. Slocum, supra note 49, at 48.
58. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 198–99 (2011).
59. Minnesota does not currently have a stranded cost recovery fee. See
Minnesota, ENERGY & ENVTL. ANALYSIS, INC., http://www.eea-inc.com/rrdb
/DGRegProject/States/Newsite/MNrevised.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E2Q7UBWN.
60. FEREIDOON P. SIOSHANSI, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UTILITY INDUSTRY 56 (2013).
61. Id. at 61.
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conservation programs.62 Furthermore, net metering and feed-in
tariffs require utilities to buy distributed renewable energy at “parity
with retail rates rather than the wholesale cost of power.”63 These
factors combine to create a feedback loop of ever-increasing
regulated utility rates while simultaneously many of the costs of
alternatives such as DER are falling, leading even more customers
producing electricity on-site and further accelerating loss of sales to
DER.64
Therefore, the rate of DER penetration continues to raise
concerns. Though Minnesota solar energy supporters proposed
legislation mandating the state’s power companies get ten percent of
their electricity from solar resources by 2030, eventually the bill was
watered down to a non-mandatory goal.65 Even so, the state’s two
largest electric companies, Xcel Energy and Great River Energy,
opposed the measure, claiming it would increase customer rates by up
to 1.3%.66 “Markets, not mandates, should drive energy
development,” added Cris Oehler, a spokeswoman for Otter Tail
Power Company of Fergus Falls, Minnesota.67
In spite of proclamations of an impending “utility death spiral,”
many analysts, including famed investor Warren Buffett, insist
such talk is premature. 68 The American Council for an Energy
Efficient Economy (ACEEE) calculates even with the rapid growth
of DG and increases in energy efficiency initiatives, energy
consumption will decrease only ten percent in the next 25 to 30
years.69 Furthermore, there are some places where it is impossible,
either due to geography or the nature of the dwelling, for
62. Solar Investment Tax Credit, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N., http://www
.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit, archived at http://perma.cc
/PJ8B-BBJV?type=live.
63. Slocum, supra note 49, at 49.
64. Id.
65. Dan Haugen, Minnesota’s New Solar Law: Looking Beyond Percentages,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (May 24, 2013), http://www.midwestenergynews.com
/2013/05/24/minnesotas-new-solar-law-looking-beyond-percentages/, archived at
http://perma.cc/H2RV-CMAL.
66. David Shaffer, Minnesota Solar Industry Pushes for Utility Mandate, STAR
TRIBUNE (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.startribune.com/business/192130991.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/S7Z3-M4PQ.
67. Id.
68. Ethan Howland, Why is Warren Buffett Investing in Utilities in the Death
Spiral Era?, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-iswarren-buffett-investing-in-utilities-in-the-death-spiral-era/236004/, archived at http:
//perma.cc/24XC-RXTW.
69. See generally Steven Nadel & Garrett Herndon, The Future of the Utility
Industry and the Role of Energy Efficiency, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGYEFFICIENT ECON. vi (June 2014), http://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files
/publications/researchreports/u1404.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6UHZ-LCVE.
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consumers to stop using grid-provided electricity—an example
being high-rise apartment buildings in densely populated urban
centers with little solar exposure.70
Though complete obsolescence of the grid may not come any
time soon, utilities still must deal with the real and present danger
of erosion of their stock value.71 For example, many experts
predict advancing storage and generation technologies, such as
those researched by the military, may one day allow ordinary
consumers to completely disconnect from the grid; the Edison
Electric Institute, a utility trade organization, admits:
Due to the variable nature of renewable DER, there is a
perception that customers will always need to remain on
the grid. While we would expect customers to remain on
the grid until a fully viable and economic distributed nonvariable resource is available, one can imagine a day when
battery storage technology or micro turbines could allow
customers to be electric grid independent.72
Shane Kann, Senior Vice President of GTWM Research notes,
“Utilities operate on a long time horizon, and concerns about grid
defection should be creeping toward the forefront of utilities’
minds now.”73
In response to perceived attacks on their business model by
DG, concerns over grid stability and reliability, and unfairness to
non-solar consumers, many utilities have gone on the offense. In
2013, Arizona Public Service (APS) proposed an $8.00/kW charge
to solar customers, arguing it was necessary in order to avoid
shifting infrastructure costs to non-solar customers.74 This proposal
coincided with the exponential growth of rooftop solar installations
in Arizona caused by new leasing programs that allowed
construction at little to no upfront cost—between June 2009 and
June 2013 rooftop solar systems in APS’s service area increased
from approximately 900 to 18,000 systems.75 Rather than accepting
70. Id.
71. Steven Lacey, Report: Solar Paired with Storage is a ‘Real, Near, and
Present’ Threat to Utilities, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/where-and-when-customers-may-startleaving-the-grid, archived at http://perma.cc/7JBB-LLYY.
72. KIND, supra note 37, at 5.
73. Lacey, supra note 71.
74. Herman K. Trabish, Arizona Preserves Net Metering by Charging a
Small Fee to Solar Owners, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Charging-a-Fee-to-Solar-Owners-PreservesNet-Metering-in-Arizona, archived at http://perma.cc/384P-29HP. The average
rooftop solar installation in Arizona is around 6 kilowatts.
75. Id.
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the $8.00/kW charge, or even the $3.00/kW charge proposed by
Arizona’s Ratepayer Advocate, the Arizona Corporation Commission
voted to charge $0.70/kW to rooftop solar owners to help offset
revenue losses.76 In April 2014, APS supported a property tax on
customers leasing solar panels in Arizona, an estimated 85% of new
solar customers.77
Arizona is not the only state dealing with DG issues. In
September 2013, Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) told solar
contractors and residents on the island of Oahu they would need
permission to connect rooftop solar systems to the island’s power
grid.78 The penetration of rooftop solar in Oahu is ten percent,
compared with California’s rate of two to three percent.79 Due to its
dependency on imported petroleum for 70% of its electricity
generation, Hawaii has the highest energy costs in the nation.80
HECO argued the unprecedented jump in solar installations caused a
situation where PV panels created more power than was consumed,
thereby creating “overvoltage” which can flow back to substations,
leading to reliability and surge problems.81 HECO also said that
overvoltage could create safety issues for their utility crews working
in the area.82
Waiting for HECO approval caused substantial delays and
frustration for new rooftop solar consumers, particularly those who
were simultaneously paying high energy bills and loan payments
on solar installations while their PV panels sat idle. In May 2014,
the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission (HPUC) found HECO was
not responding to customer demand fast enough, and ordered the
utility to come up with a “core comprehensive strategy that can
lower costs and help connect more PV systems to the grid.”83
The responses of HECO and APS are but one of many
reactions incumbent utilities can have to DG growth. The next
section will examine two broad modalities of these responses: 1)
ratemaking measures to mitigate costs associated with DG expansion
76. Id.
77. Kiley Kroh, Arizona May Impose Unusual New Tax on Customers Who
Lease Solar Panels, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 30, 2014, 9:28 AM), http://think
progress.org, archived at http://perma.cc/6AED-GB8X.
78. Anne C. Mulkern, Islands: Hawaii Solar Boom So Successful, It’s Been
Halted, ENV’T & ENERGY PUBL’G (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.eenews.net
/stories/1059992167, archived at http://perma.cc/WC7C-XNFU.
79. Id.
80. Kiley Kroh, Hawaii’s Largest Utility Ordered to Help Customers Install
More Rooftop Solar, THINK PROGRESS (May 2, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://think
progress .org, archived at http://perma.cc/6AED-GB8X.
81. See Mulkern, supra note 78.
82. Id.
83. Kroh, supra note 80.
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and equalize the burden appropriately between DG and non-DG
customers and 2) alternative utility and regulatory structures designed
to enable incumbent utilities to compete with outside entrants.84
III. RESPONSE TO GROWTH IN DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
Existing regulatory and rate-recovery mechanisms can create
disincentives for customer-owned DG. The Edison Institute
advocates “revis[ing] utility tariff structures in order to eliminate
cross subsidies (by non-DER participants) and investor costrecovery uncertainties.”85 It is reasonable to expect utilities and
regulators to turn to the familiar mechanism of ratemaking to
diminish the impact of DG entrants in the market.86 Many states,
including Minnesota, rely on traditional cost-of-service ratemaking
and volumetric pricing in order to allow utilities to recover their
costs of service, with allowed rates of return on equity.87 Some
utilities have argued linking a utility’s profits to the volume of
electricity consumed creates disincentives for the utility to
encourage energy efficiency while magnifying the harm for
remaining non-DG customers when DG customers use less
energy.88
One method of addressing disincentives for energy conservation
and renewable energy is “decoupling,” which can reduce lost
revenues for shareholders as well as break the link between sales and
profitability.89 Minnesota Statutes 216B.2412 defines decoupling as a
“regulatory tool designed to separate a utility’s revenue from changes
in energy sales. The purpose of decoupling is to reduce a utility’s
disincentive to promote energy efficiency.”90 The same statute
provides for the development of pilot programs to assess rate
decoupling among rate-regulated utilities.91
Another method to recover lost revenue is the imposition of
backup/standby rates, interconnection charges, and universal access
charges against DG users to ensure they pay a fair share of
transmission and distribution costs that would otherwise be

84.
85.
86.
87.

See generally Slocum, supra note 49, at 47.
KIND, supra note 37, at 19.
Id. at 5.
MICHAEL T. BURR, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MINNESOTA
MICROGRIDS: BARRIERS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND PATHWAYS TOWARD ENERGY
ASSURANCE 10 (2013).
88. Id.
89. Slocum, supra note 49, at 50.
90. MINN. STAT. § 216B.2412 (2003).
91. Id.

2015]

ALLOWING UTILITIES TO COMPETE

389

subsidized by other users.92 Standby rates are often not effective
because the actual costs incurred by the network vary according to
time of day and location.93 Because of this uncertainty and lack of
transparency, the 2013 Minnesota Omnibus Energy Bill amended
Minnesota Statutes 216B.164 to prohibit standby charges for facilities
smaller than 100 kW.94
Other utilities have sought to reduce or eliminate incentives such
as net metering, arguing they are no longer necessary as renewable
energy costs and technology reach parity with nonrenewable
resources. As of February 2014, 43 states and the District of
Columbia had policies encouraging the rolling over of credits for
excess electricity to future utility bills.95 Utilities contend DG
customers receive more credit than the overall benefits they provide
to the grid; rather than just receiving the cost of the power credited
to their next month’s bill, customers with solar systems are credited
at the full retail electricity rate, meaning the cost of the power, plus
fixed costs such as poles, wires, meters, and other infrastructure.96
According to the Edison Electric Institute, the average residential
customer paying $110 a month for electricity is paying for $60
worth of grid service; net-metered customers avoid paying these
grid-related costs through rollover credits, thereby passing these
costs on to other customers.97 In Kansas, for example, utilities
supported legislation that would reduce the amount of money solar
customers would receive from net metering.98 Similar battles have
taken place in Arizona, North Carolina, California, and Colorado.99
Regardless of whether such measures are for reasons of
fairness and equity (as argued by utilities) or to preserve revenue
(as argued by DG advocates), ratemaking responses inevitably
have the effect of alienating the very customers the utilities are
seeking to retain. Inevitably there will be accusations that the
incumbent utility is seeking to “punish” DG users, regardless of
92.
93.
94.
95.

KIND, supra note 37, at 24.
BURR, supra note 87, at 35.
MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2003).
Pamela Prah, States Brace for Utilities, Solar Advocates Clash, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/, archived at
http://perma.cc/E5S9-4B4W.
96. Id.
97. See Straight Talk About Net Metering, EDISON ELEC. INST. 2 (Sept. 2013),
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/generation/NetMetering/Documents/Straight%
20Talk%20About%20Net%20Metering.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ F4DVY7KH.
98. Kan. HB 2458. Net metering and excess energy credits. The measure
was stricken from the calendar as of Feb. 28, 2014.
99. Prah, supra note 95.
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how justified or altruistic such measures may be.100 As the cases in
Arizona and Hawaii demonstrate, efforts appearing to obstruct or
hinder the expansion of renewable DER, largely seen by the public
as a “good thing,” usually either fall far short of making the utility
whole or fail outright while simultaneously turning public opinion
against the utility. Even if such efforts are successful, they still do
not address the underlying problem of losing revenue to DG/DER
long term.
Though some efforts of cost recovery such as standby fees are
necessary, a better, more strategic approach to the threat of DG/DER
is to change the traditional utility business model rather than sit idly
by as revenue diminishes.101 As the Edison Electric Institute noted
in its report on DG, “Participants in all industries must prepare for
and develop plans to address disruptive threats, including plans to
replace their own technology” with alternatives.102 “Ultimately, all
stakeholders must embrace change in technology and business
models in order to maintain a viable utility industry,” the report
added.103 It appears some in the industry are listening: According to
a recent Pricewaterhouse Coopers survey, rather than viewing DG as
a “disruptive threat” 82% of utility executives view DG as an
“opportunity.”104
One justification for utilities to embrace DER, particularly DG
solar, is the opportunity to enhance shareholder returns. Utilities need
capital investments to ensure healthy returns for shareholders; private
utilities invest in infrastructure and then charge customers enough to
earn the investment back plus an authorized rate of return.105 Longterm solar contracts between utilities and homeowners could
guarantee a steady revenue stream for the length of the contract,
typically up to 25 years.106 With the potential of a $6 billion market
and just one percent penetration, rooftop solar is “just getting started”
according to Kristian Hanelt, Senior Vice President of Renewable
Capital Markets at Clean Power Finance.107
100. Slocum, supra note 49, at 50.
101. See generally Slocum, supra note 49.
102. KIND, supra note 37, at 6.
103. Id at 19.
104. Davide Savenije, 94% of Utility Execs Predict Business Model Upheaval,
UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 7, 2013) http://www.utilitydive.com/, archived at http://perma
.cc/7N9D-5LED.
105. Maria Galluci, Why Are Some Big Utilities Embracing Small-Scale Solar
Power?, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://insideclimatenews.org/,
archived at http://perma.cc/4HJT-3BCE.
106. Kristian Hanelt, Making Friends with Solar DG, PUB. UTILS. FORT
NIGHTLY, Sept. 2013, at 10.
107. Id.
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Increased adoption of DG would also drive down costs for
incumbent ratepayers. Mr. Hanelt observes that out of 80 million
detached single-family homes in the United States, 56 million
would be able to save money by switching to rooftop solar.108
Utility customers who adopt rooftop solar could use the monthly
savings in their electricity bill to help pay for the system.109 Thus,
utilities that fight, rather than embrace, the DER/DG market may
be forgoing a potentially lucrative opportunity to participate.
Additionally, due to their regulated monopoly status and their
regular interactions with capital markets, utilities are able to raise
capital at rates much lower than those obtained by non-utilities
who invest in DER, thereby lowering overall costs to utility
consumers.110
Utilities must learn these lessons quickly; a failure to understand
the paradigm shift wrought by renewable DER has already had realworld consequences for utilities and their shareholders in other
countries. In 2011, the main political parties in Germany agreed to an
11 year phase-out of nuclear plants in the response to the Fukushima
nuclear accident in Japan; additionally, the government set a target of
cutting carbon emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050, with renewables
supplying 80% of Germany’s electricity.111 In response to the policy,
RWE, a German utility company, started burning more coal to keep
up with demand while transitioning from nuclear power, and at the
same time an unusually cold winter increased fossil fuel prices.112 In
March 2014, RWE’s CEO, Peter Terium, admitted the company’s
€2.8 billion loss, the first loss in 60 years, was largely attributable to a
misguided focus on conventional fossil fuels over renewable and
distributed energy.113 “We were late entering into the renewables
market—possibly too late,” Terium said; rather than strategizing
for the long run, RWE instead chose to meet immediate demands
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Michael Mendelsohn, Where is All the Utility Investment? Are
Utilities Missing an Opportunity to Finance Solar and Storage?, NAT’L ENERGY
LAB. (Oct. 14, 2013, 2:14 PM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/whereall-utility-investment-are-utilities-missing-opportunity-finance-solar-andstorage, archived at https://perma.cc/S35R-9AYA.
111. Fred Pearce, On the Road to Green Energy, Germany Detours on Dirty
Coal, YALE ENVT. 360 (May 29, 2014), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/on_the
road_to_green_energy_germany_detours_on_dirty_coal/2769/ archived at http://
perma.cc/Y8LA-AAUJ.
112. Id.
113. Giles Parkinson, Germany: Fossil Fuel Industry Decline is Unstoppable,
CLEAN TECHNICA (Mar. 7, 2014), http://cleantechnica.com/2014/03/07/germanyfossil-fuel-industry-decline-unstoppable/, archived at http://perma.cc/8RBWFGH6.
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and damn the consequences.114 Renewable energy comprises 31% of
the German electricity sector,115 far exceeding that of the United
States. Nonetheless, utilities in the United States can learn from
RWE’s failures. After all, according to the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory, renewable energy generation has the potential to
supply 80% of total electricity generation in the United States by
2050.116
Overall, whether provided by third parties or the incumbent,
increased use of DER would offer benefits to consumers and the
environment and improve electricity production and delivery as a
whole. Minnesota’s grid suffers significant outages due to blizzards
and ice, floods, tornados, and wind storms, as well as equipment
failure; the proliferation of DG would help mitigate and possibly
prevent some of these outages, especially as storage and battery
technologies improve.117 The issue of DER and the future of
renewables in Minnesota takes on a pressing importance when
considering that both of the state’s nuclear plants will retire in 2030
and 2033 and 50% of Minnesota coal-fired power plants will be more
than 40 years old by 2017.118 Such concerns, combined with a
progressive stance towards renewable energy and DG in general,
enabled the passage of DER friendly laws in Minnesota in 2013 and
2014: Under recently passed legislation, investor-owned utilities in
Minnesota must add an estimated 450 MW of solar power to their
systems between 2013 and 2020, a tenth of which will need to come
from small systems of up to 20 kW.119
The prospect of the expansion of DER, as well as the potential
resources and pivotal role incumbent utilities play in the management
114. Id. Karel Beckman, RWE Sheds Old Business Model, Embraces New
Energy Reality, RENEWECONOMY (Oct. 22, 2013), http://reneweconomy.com.
au/2013/rwe-sheds-old-business-model-embraces-new-energy-reality-52967,
archived at http://perma.cc/J3GN-MZ4V.
115. Caroline Winter, Germany Reaches New Levels of Greendom, Gets 31
Percent of Its Electricity From Renewables, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-14/germany-reaches-new-levelsof-greendom-gets-31-percent-of-its-electricity-from-renewables, archived at http:
//perma.cc/H3UG-LB2N.
116. Ronald Lehr, New Utility Business Models: Utility and Regulatory Models
for the Modern Era, 26 ELEC. J. 8, 35 (2011).
117. BURR, supra note 87, at 17.
118. Kim W. Havey, Metropolitan Energy Policy Coalition Solar Finance
Workshop, MINN. DEP’T OF COMM. 13 (Jul. 30, 2014), http://www.mepcmn.org/FinancingSolarJULY14/Solar%20Regulation%20Kim%20Havey%20Com
merce%207%2030%2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8V4L-QMY9.
119. Dan Haugen, Minnesota’s New Solar Law: Looking Beyond Percentages,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (May 24, 2013), http://www.midwestenergynews
.com/2013/05/24/minnesotas-new-solar-law-looking-beyond-percentages/, archived
at http://perma.cc/Q8AU-52Q7.
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of the commercial grid, indicate there is a role for them to play in
the future of DER. Given the incumbent utility’s legal obligation to
provide universal service in exchange for exclusive franchise
rights,120 the question arises as to whether the benefits of allowing
incumbents to directly compete with third parties for DER market
share outweigh the potential costs, and what second- and third-order
effects may arise from such an arrangement. The following
paragraphs examine arguments for and against direct incumbent
utility involvement in the DER market.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST UTILITY INVOLVEMENT
There are a number of arguments against allowing incumbent
utilities to directly compete with third parties. A New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) report on
the subject states that “[electric] market structures are developed to
prevent the exercise of undue market power over the price or
availability of power by any market participant.”121 One issue cited
by the NYSERDA report is the advantage of incumbent utility in
terms of “access to information or the cost of information for predevelopment activities,” the most likely being information about
current and future T&D relief needs.122 Many third-party installers
argue that utilities with the advantages of name recognition, access
to information, and low-cost capital, will dominate the market,
driving many of their competitors to extinction. They argue it would
be better to have the utility stay out of the market altogether, instead
providing information and incentives targeted to third parties to
promote growth in those areas most likely to benefit the grid as a
whole.
Conversely, the expertise and resources incumbent utilities
bring to bear on the market can encourage rapid adoption of
renewable DG, allowing it to gain a foothold in the market rather
than remaining an outlier. Recent years have shown these assets
can provide carbon-free generation, hedges against fuel price risk,
deferment of transmission and distribution upgrades, and valuable
120. See generally Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Power
Markets: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 29 (2000).
121. Michael Razanousky, et al., Deployment of Distributed Generation for Grid
Support and Distribution Infrastructure: a Summary Analysis of DG Benefits and
Case Studies, NEW YORK STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH. 15 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/SynapseReport.2011-02.NY
SERDA.DG-Benefits-and-Case-Studies.07-081.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/A6G3-4EX7.
122. Id. at 4.
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grid resiliency at a price comparable to non-DER resources.123 The
faster DG is adopted the quicker these benefits can be realized.
For their part, utilities argue unregulated third parties have a
significant advantage over incumbents, who are both subject to state
and federal regulations for safety and reliability as well as economic
rate of return regulation by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC).124
According to the regulatory compact, the incumbent is required to
serve all customers located in an assigned service territory, including
those DG owners who may be subsidized by other users, as well as
low-income consumers.125 In addition, the incumbent must plan for
all customer’s needs; the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) process
requires incumbent utilities to plan “to meet present and future
customer demands by designing their generation mix to make
reasonably priced electricity adequately available on a reliable
basis.”126 Thus, the utility must be prepared to serve, even if a
customer reduces or alters its usage through the use of DG without
notice to the utility, or decides to abandon its DG investment and
return to the grid. Additionally, rather than having the flexibility to
adapt to the changing needs of the market, utilities must consult with
and receive approval from the PUC before changing rate structures
or offerings. As a result, incumbent utilities lack flexibility to react
to market contingencies and business opportunities. Key decisions
by incumbents must undergo a lengthy, and often contentious,
review process using time, personnel, and resources. Third parties
have no such constraints.
Moreover, third parties continue to enjoy the advantages of net
metering policies as well as grid backup, while imposing additional
costs to the incumbent in the form of administrative and backup
supply burdens due to the variable nature of renewable DER.127
Though the incumbent must also provide backup power should it
install its own renewable DER, such costs may be mitigated,
planned for, shifted, and internalized. Third parties transfer risk to
incumbent utilities if they use non-standard technologies unfamiliar
to incumbent power engineers who still have the burden to ensure
interconnected systems are safe and do not impose reliability
issues.128
Without utility involvement in the DG market, utilities are
seeing the erosion of their customer base without any corresponding
123. Mendelsohn, supra note 110.
124. STATE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES REVIEW COMMITTEE ENERGY
ADVISORY COUNSEL, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES REPORT 45 (Jan. 2014).
125. Id. at 46.
126. Id. at 47.
127. KIND, supra note 37, at 5.
128. BURR, supra note 87, at 34.
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compensation to make up for the loss. In the meantime, upkeep of
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure must still be
maintained for the benefit of both the DG and non-DG consumer
alike. Allowing incumbent utilities to compete makes them active
participants in the DG market, fostering enthusiasm for DG
expansion that cannot be substituted for with regulatory mandates,
while helping to maintain their financial health.
Furthermore, direct participation in the DG market is consistent
with utility obligations and can help ensure equity among
consumers. Unlike private actors, public utilities hold a unique
position in public life. Minnesota Statutes 216B.01 states:
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest that public
utilities be regulated as hereinafter provided in order to
provide the retail consumers of natural gas and electric
service in this state with adequate and reliable services at
reasonable rates, consistent with the financial and economic
requirements of public utilities and their need to construct
facilities to provide such services or to otherwise obtain
energy supplies, to avoid unnecessary duplication of
facilities which increase the cost of service to the consumer
and to minimize disputes between public utilities which
may result in inconvenience or diminish efficiency in
service to the consumers.129
The statutory purpose of the public utility is to provide reliable
electricity at a reasonable cost. The overarching goal as established
by the Minnesota Legislature is not competition or profitability,
but rather reliability and affordability. Both of these goals can be
achieved through the rapid expansion of DER facilitated by the
incumbent’s participation in the market.
Currently, those residential customers purchasing or leasing solar
installations tend to be wealthier than the average electrical consumer:
Between complicated local permitting requirements (costing up to
$2,000 in some cities), owning a residence that allows for such
installations (i.e. a house versus an apartment), having sufficient
taxable assets to take advantage of incentives provided by the federal
and state governments, or even having good enough credit to secure a
lease, there are significant obstacles for lower income consumers.130
If the goal is to promote the expansion of renewable DG beyond
129. MINN. STAT. § 216B.01 (2003).
130. See Umair Irfan and Kandy Wong, Renewable Energy: Solar Water
Heaters Bloom on China’s Rooftops but not in the U.S., CLIMATEWIRE (Jul. 2,
2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059983772, archived at http://perma.cc
/RUN9-Q2PE.
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those who already have the ability to use it (i.e. the wealthy), the
utility offers advantages over third party providers. First of all,
many third party providers may be uninterested in extending
service in lower income areas, even with incentives provided by
the utility. Conversely, regardless of consumer wealth, the utility
still has the obligation to act as the provider of last resort, and
providing DG in those areas may lower overall costs for the utility,
and ultimately, to its ratepayers.
Additionally, many consumers may not want the hassle of dealing
with competing providers. As one writer observed:
Call me a lousy consumer, or maybe just a lazy one, but I
don’t want choices when it comes to my energy supplier…I
do not feel qualified or knowledgeable enough to weigh the
many options out there, and it made my head hurt to
contemplate trying to do that for myself.131
Research conducted during the deregulation of the electricity
market in some states has shown consumers
have difficulty evaluating the barrage of advertising and
marketing material associated with customer choice, are
concerned about the reliability of their new provider, and
expect exaggerated or misleading advertising claims by
green power marketers. Not surprisingly, many consumers
exposed to competitive electricity markets simply find
choice overwhelming and, as a result, find it easier to do
nothing.132
Inertia on part of the consumer can result in a situation in
which the electric system could benefit from DG, but the market
fails to provide it. In this instance it is the utility, having the
obligation to provide power while making the system work, that
has the incentive to intervene and place DG as part of that system.
In such instances, the market is better with the incumbent-utility
competitor than without it.

131. Cathy Woodruff, Too Many Choices Lead to Too Much Confusion, THE
ADVOCATE (Oct. 3, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Toomany-choices-lead-to-too-much-confusion-2187518.php, archived at http://perma
.cc/35CA-DFDZ?type=live.
132. RYAN WISER, ET. AL, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., GREEN POWER
MARKETING IN RETAIL COMPETITION: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT 11 (Feb. 1999),
available at http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/REPORT%2042282.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/CZW9-7FQW.
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V. INCUMBENT UTILITIES IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Many of the arguments for and against incumbent participation
in DER expansion are being played out in Arizona. In July of 2013,
APS, the incumbent utility provider, argued before the Arizona
Corporation Commission (ACC) that in addition to unfair net
metering policies shifting costs to non-DG customers, “[a]dditional
benefits claimed from rooftop solar, such as long-term fuel hedging,
impacts on national and regional commodity prices, employment
benefits from solar jobs and compliance costs for the renewable
portfolio standard are either double-counting, spurious, unproven or
all three.”133 A month later, APS complained bitterly that it did not
believe “ancillary benefits of rooftop solar…which include
commodity price mitigation, grid security, and economic
development, would provide any significant value (if any at all) in
reducing utility costs or in mitigating the cost shift that results from
net metering.”134 Two months after that, APS categorically denied
any sort of benefits of rooftop solar over large-scale solar facilities,
asking “why should APS customers pay more for energy produced
by rooftop solar than for energy produced by utility-scale solar
facilities . . . ?”135
These arguments lost their forcefulness, however, when on July
28th, 2014, APS filed a proposal with the ACC asking for permission
to develop 20 MW of solar PV systems on 3,000 rooftops in the state
of Arizona through the end of 2015.136 APS announced it was
proposing the 20 MW utility-owned residential DG program in
“respon[se] to clear customer interest.”137 Under this program, APS
would “install the DG on customer rooftops and on the utility side of
the meter,” renting these rooftops for 20 years in exchange for a 30
dollar per month bill credit.138 If approved, this program would render
net metering concerns for those customers taking part in the program
133. Stephen Lacey, Flashback: Before Calling Rooftop Solar ‘Exciting,’ APS
Said Its Benefits Were ‘Unproven’, GREENTECHMEDIA (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/before-and-after-heres-what-aps-said-about-roof
top-solar-before-deciding-to?utm_source=Daily&utm_medium=Headline&utm
_campaign=GTMDaily, archived at http://perma.cc/Z28R-EKJK.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Stephen Lacey, Arizona Public Service Enters the Rooftop Solar Business:
Good for Installers or a Trojan Horse?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jul. 30, 2014),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizona-public-service-enters-the-roof
top-solar-biz, archived at http://perma.cc/XHG6-GMVM.
137. Arizona Public Service, No. E-01345A-13-0140, (July 28, 2014) 1,
available at http://www.energymanagertoday.com/arizona-utility-180-solar0103630/, archived at http://perma.cc/6J74-M2EE.
138. Id.
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moot. According to the proposal “AZ Sun DG customers would not
take net metering service,” though they would “continue taking
service under any rate for which they would otherwise be eligible.”139
APS would also “competitively select local solar installers to build
AZ Sun DG” to deploy these systems, “strategically deploy[ing] a
portion of the 3,000 systems to pursue specific purposes, such as
serving low income or low credit score customers and providing
system benefits.”140 Additionally, APS would orient these systems to
“maximize the amount of solar production during system peak
periods” and install advanced inverters to “provide flexibility to
manage power quality and lay the foundation for better integrating
rooftop solar with the distribution system.”141
Many solar advocates and national solar companies are crying
foul over APS’s solar rooftop proposal, complaining it is nothing
more than a ploy to strengthen APS’s stranglehold on Arizona’s
power industry. “The irony here is that APS has spent two years
complaining about how terrible solar is [and] how it’s a massive
problem for the grid. But now they are saying it’s fine, as long as they
can control it entirely,” complained a spokesman for the Alliance for
Solar Choice, an advocacy group representing solar service
companies.142 He has a point: Even while touting its contribution to
the overall industry by setting aside projects for local installers,
should the proposal be passed, APS would be controlling its former
competitors.
Regardless, APS’s plan addresses many of the concerns that come
with the expansion of DG while preserving many of its benefits. First,
it contributes to achieving Arizona’s Renewable Energy Standard
(RES) of 15% by 2025, with 30% of the total to be derived from
distributed energy technologies.143 The proposal enhances APS’s
ability to target and control installation while keeping upgrade costs
down, allowing APS to position DG assets in places with the greatest
benefit to the grid.144 If approved, APS will gain expertise in both
installation and maintenance of these systems while benefiting from
the ability to buy DG equipment in bulk. Moreover, because of APS’s
large balance sheets, thanks to its T&D assets, APS will be able to tap

139. Id. at 2.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2–3.
142. Lacey, supra note 136.
143. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE §§ R14-2-1801–1816 (2007).
144. Email from Donna Attanasio, Senior Energy Advisor, The George
Washington University (July 30, 2014) (on file with the author).
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into low-cost capital to finance the expansion.145 The proposal also
neutralizes many of APS’s previous opponents; many local installers
initially opposed to APS’s efforts are now eligible to bid on the
proposed solar installations.146 Nonetheless, national solar companies
assert APS’s proposal would ultimately quash competition in the state
because it is the incumbent utility, rather than the consumer, making
the choice.
A primary concern for third parties competing with an incumbent
utility like APS is the regulatory structure that facilitates the utility’s
ability to make authorized rate of return on its DG investment. Ken
Johnson, a Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) spokesman
observed, “This latest tactic by APS has a ‘Trojan horse’ smell to it.
Our member companies welcome fair and equal competition, but this
move would stack the deck in favor of a company which can ratebase solar with a guaranteed rate of return. How is that fair?”147 This
is in addition to the built-in advantage of name recognition and
existing connections with customers that incumbent utilities already
have over third party competitors.148
VI. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
If incumbent utilities are allowed to directly compete with third
parties, unfair competitive advantages on both sides would have to be
addressed. How would third parties be able to match the name
recognition and access utilities already have with their customers? Is
it fair that utilities have to seek PUC approval before every change in
their business models, even those that may lower overall costs for
their consumers?
Ostensibly, the purpose of competition is to provide a better
product to consumers while lowering costs and increasing
innovation. Before utilities could compete with non-utility service
providers, they would need the flexibility to adjust their service
offerings with more ease and frequency, which in turn would require
a more flexible relationship with regulators.149 Though recent
145. See Rob Day, Why Are Utilities Letting Other People Take All the Value?,
CLEANTECH INVESTING (Apr. 4, 2013, 1:37 PM), http://www.greentechmedia.com
/cleantech-investing/post/why-are-utilities-letting-other-people-take-all-the-value,
archived at http://perma.cc/MWX7-NAZX.
146. Lacey, supra note 136.
147. Id.
148. Day, supra note 145.
149. See Bentham Paulos, Debate About the Future of Utilities Moves Deeper
Into the World of Regulation, GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.green
techmedia.com/articles/read/debate-about-the-future-of-utilities-moves-deeper-intothe-world-of-regulat, archived at http://perma.cc/9AQS-4MQ3.
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innovations such as energy efficiency and environmental regulations
have been compatible with the current regulatory structure, DER is a
fundamentally different paradigm; “They are forcing the creation of
a new market that the current regulatory system is not optimized
for,” said Joseph Scalise of Bain and Company, a global
management-consulting firm.150 Until the regulatory structure is able
to catch up, it is reasonable to provide utilities more leeway in
optimizing their DG offerings to their consumers. This flexibility
could be achieved by allowing utilities more latitude in configuring
systems and pricing for their DG systems, at least until those
systems comprise a certain percentage of the market.
Utilities already have the burden of planning for future power
needs and upgrades through the IRP process; they know where
infrastructure will need replacement, where neighborhoods are
expanding, and where DG implementation would have the greatest
benefit. As part of this process, utilities must set-aside a certain
percentage of power generation for renewables. For example, under
Minnesota law, utilities are required to include “the least cost plan for
meeting 50 and 75% of all new and refurbished capacity needs
through a combination of conservation and renewable energy
resources.”151 In a similar manner, incumbent utilities could be
required to file an IRP with a certain percentage of generating
capacity reserved for DG, allotting a certain percentage of generation
to third party providers. Both figures would be set by the PUC, and
would be a floor rather than a ceiling. Utilities could also be given
rate incentives for reducing overall expenses through the strategic use
of DG. As part of this process utilities would be required to provide
access to information on customers and planned growth and upgrades
to non-utility competitors.
Mandating that third parties provide a certain threshold
percentage of all renewable DG in the state could allay concerns
by utilities about unfair competitive advantage. For instance, if
50% of all new power needs must be supplied by renewable
energy, then at least 25% of those renewable energy sources must
be provided by third party contractors. This would be a floor, not a
ceiling; if more than 25% of consumers chose third party providers
over the incumbent, there would be no cap. Similarly, if less than
25% of consumers chose the third party, the utility would have to
contract out the remainder among third parties. Therefore, utilities
would still have an incentive to compete while ensuring more fair
competition for new entrants.
150. Id.
151. MINN. STAT. § 216B.2422 (1)(e)(2) (2014).
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At the same time, there are a number of strategies that can level
the playing field for third parties competing against incumbents. For
example, the low-cost capital advantage of utilities can be mitigated
with a separate low-interest loan program established exclusively for
third party installers. Minnesota’s Agricultural and Economic
Development Board administers the Small Business Development
Loan Program, providing up to $5 million for any one business with
20% of project costs privately financed through equity or other
sources.152 A similar program could be created for third-party solar
installers, along with incentives such as tax breaks. Alternatively,
the utility incumbents could provide financing to third parties as a
method to meet their RPS goals, or purchase their services outright.
Name recognition and relationships between incumbent utilities
and their customers are harder to mitigate. Just as it took many years
for people to recognize “Virgin Mobile” as readily as “AT&T,” such
recognition takes time. This transition can be facilitated by utilities
providing on-bill comparisons between themselves and third-party
providers.
Additionally,
the
PUC
can
provide
a
webpage/clearinghouse for rate and financing comparisons, such as
the one used by the Texas PUC.153 A similar clearinghouse can be
established for third party providers with customer information and
planned construction, so all parties have access to the same
information.
Ultimately, the advantage of having the incumbent utility compete
in the market rather than merely providing information and incentives
to third parties comes down to a matter of orderly expansion and
boosting the overall demand for renewable DG. The advantages
enjoyed by the utility over third parties, such as name recognition,
trust, customer service, and billing experience, are the same ones that
allow it to make renewable DG attractive to customers who would not
otherwise choose to do so. Without incumbent utility participation, it
will likely take longer for renewable DG to reach a critical mass as
third parties attempt to target those consumers willing to give up the
certainty and reliability of the provider they have known for years in
exchange for incentives that may or may not be appealing.
Ultimately, it will be up to the legislature to decide whether it favors
competition with a longer timeline for DG adoption or reliability and
predictability with incumbent participation as a partner in DG
152. See Small Business Development Loan Program, MINN. DEP’T OF EMP’T &
ECON.,
http://mn.gov/deed/business/financing-business/deed-programs/small-bizloans.jsp, archived at http://perma.cc/QW7Y-HUVU (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
153. See Electric Industry Rates & Tariffs, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TX.,
http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/Electric/rates/Default.aspx, archived at http:
//perma.cc/F8BT-G59X (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).

402

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

development. The alternative is having the incumbent utility be an
unwilling and resentful facilitator forced to participate in its own
untimely death through the stick of regulation.
CONCLUSION
Though concerns over the utility’s unfair competitive advantage
are noteworthy, they are not enough to overcome the certain
advantages that will be offered when the utility throws its resources
and experience behind DG. Allowing incumbent utilities to compete
in the renewable DG market will encourage adoption and investment
in DER, which in turn will accelerate benefits such as carbon
mitigation, lowered fuel costs, and grid stability. In addition to
benefiting the consumer, the utility, and installers, permitting such
competition would encourage innovation, provided the utility is given
both the flexibility and incentive to do so.
While utilities occupy a strong position within their exclusive
territories in terms of competitive advantage, this will likely erode
over time as third parties and new technologies offer consumers other
options.154 Allowing utilities in the marketplace will ease the
transition to DG by giving consumers the option of keeping the
provider they think of as being reliable and familiar while moving
towards a new paradigm of power generation and distribution.
Information sharing and low-interest financing could ensure
fairness and decrease overall costs for competitors and consumers.
Meanwhile, set-asides can nurture the industry in its infancy like net
metering before it by attracting third-party competitors and investors,
which in turn can attract employment opportunities for Minnesotans.
Just like the example of deregulation forcing utilities to think
critically about how to attract and retain customers by offering “green
power,” so too can competition in the renewable DG/DER market
encourage innovation and enhance customer service.
The durability of the incumbent utility business model, combined
with the inexorable rise of renewable DG technology, means it is both
necessary and beneficial to start incorporating incumbents into the
DER market as soon as possible. The most efficient way to do this is
to take advantage of the profit motive by allowing utilities to compete
in providing DER solutions while retaining the current options for
customers to install DER using a third party. By combining
reasonable constraints on the competitive advantage, transparency of
information for the consumer and competitors, and flexibility to
innovate, stakeholders can ensure a smooth transition while lowering
costs and increasing choice. In this manner, both incumbents and third
154. Razanousky, supra note 121.
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parties can meet the regulatory and aspirational goals of making
Minnesota a leader in providing green energy at reasonable prices
while ensuring reliability and sustainability.

